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was wrong with its iscal adjustment, this paper compares Greece with the other European Union country that was hit be the most severe iscal crisis, namely Latvia. The conclusion is that front-loaded iscal adjustment works much better. Greek economic policy has been a popular topic among opinion writers, notably Nobel Prize winner and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, who claimed that Greece suffered from austerity. Because of his prominence in the international public debate, the paper scrutinizes his arguments on the Greek crisis.
The paper also examines what policy the International Monetary Fund has pursued with regard to Greece, and how its views have been inluenced by the debate and Greek economic developments. Finally, the paper assesses what lessons that can be drawn from the contrasting experiences of Latvia and Greece. The conclusion is that a iscal adjustment should be suficient to resolve the crisis to restore conidence and that it should be as front-loaded as is practically and politically possible.
Introduction
The far left party Syriza won the Greek parliamentary elections on January 25 by campaigning against austerity. Its victory is a cause to look back upon the experiences of iscal adjustment in Europe, in general, and Greece, in particular, since the global inancial crisis hit in 2008 2 .
Why did Greece do so poorly in comparison with all other European Union countries?
Greece has suffered a long and severe economic recession, more than necessary. In the last six years, its GDP plummeted by 23% (IMF 2014d) . What was wrong with its iscal adjustment?
To answer that query, this paper will compare Greece with the other European Union country hit by the most severe iscal crisis, namely Latvia.
Second, Greek economic policy has been a popular topic among opinion writers. Their leader has been Nobel Prize winner and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, who has led the camp claiming that Greece suffered from austerity. Because of his prominence in the international public debate, I shall focus on him and scrutinize his arguments on the Greek crisis.
The third part of this paper examines what policy the International Monetary Fund has pursued with regard to Greece as well as how its views have been inluenced by the debate and Greek economic developments.
Finally, I conclude with what lessons can be drawn from the contrasting experiences of Latvia and Greece. The conclusion is that a iscal adjustment should be suficient to resolve the crisis and to restore conidence and that it should be as front-loaded as is practically and politically possible. from many shortcomings and may confuse more than it clariies. Financial crises vary greatly both by nature and dignity. Many variables are at play, and one has to control for irrelevant variables, but the more variables that are the same, the less there is to control for. The difference is big between a minor and a major iscal crisis. Therefore, I am focusing on the two extreme cases, Greece and Latvia, with the biggest iscal deicits, the biggest required iscal adjustment, and the most substantial output falls. Both countries were also members of the European Union and had many international institutions in common. Latvia maintained a ixed exchange rate to the euro, while Greece adopted the euro in 2001, allowing us to sidestep the exchange rate issue 3 . Monetary policy differed greatly, because Greece had access to ample liquidity from the European Central Bank (ECB), while Latvia did not, putting Greece at a major advantage in 2008-09.
To start, we need to deine "austerity". An ordinary deinition of "austerity" is "measures taken by a government to reduce an excessive budget deicit by cutting expenditures or raising revenues". I prefer the more technical term iscal adjustment. The issue is not how much government expenditure was cut or revenues increased, but how the budget deicit evolved as a share of GDP.
Contrary Crisis Policies
The inancial crisis hit the world with massive force, with a sudden stop of international inancial lows after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 . Most countries faced a temporary liquidity freeze leading to a deterioration of their iscal situation, and many ended up in iscal crisis. Among the then-27 members of the European Union, all but one (Poland) recorded an output contraction in 2009. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania experienced the greatest general overheating. They had large current account deicits and high inlation, with economies operating beyond their actual capacity. The global inancial crisis delivered a sudden stop to international inance, which led to a sudden and sharp fall in output of 14-24% in two years. Latvia's contraction was 24% in two years. (Table 1) . Already by July 2009, the Latvian government had restored investment conidence. Although the budget deicit for that year was 8.9% of GDP, the policy action and direction were suficient to convince the market. Funds started lowing into the country and the Latvian recession lasted only two years (Åslund and Dombrovskis 2011, 102-110) .
When its crisis erupted in 2010, Greece faced the most severe iscal crisis. Among the EU countries, it had the largest budget deicit and public debt, though it also had the worst corruption and business environment (Transparency International 2010). In 2009, Greece's iscal mismanagement had boosted its budget deicit to 15.2% of GDP and its public debt to 127% of GDP (Eurostat 2014 Greece could have tried to replicate the successful Latvian crisis resolution, but it did the opposite. According to the IMF, its iscal adjustment in 2010 was a paltry 2.5% of GDP and in 2011, only 4.1% of GDP, a total of only 6.6% of GDP in two years, when Latvia had carried out a iscal consolidation of 14.7% of GDP. Greece's total iscal adjustment over four years was only 11.1% of GDP, compared with 17.5% of GDP in Latvia ( Table 2 ). The attempted therapy fell far short of the disease, precluding any cure. Needless to say, no inancial conidence was restored.
The key to the resolution of a inancial crisis is to get ahead of the curve, to pursue a suficiently fast iscal adjustment so that the budget deicit as a share of GDP falls. Latvia did so.
In its fourth year of iscal adjustment, Latvia had an insigniicant budget deicit of 0.8% of GDP.
Alas, because of its inadequate iscal adjustment, the Greek government never managed to get ahead of the curve and reduce its budget deicit as a share of GDP, since the size of GDP was declining as well, as is usually the case in a severe crisis. Hence, market conidence was never restored. During the four years from 2010-13, Greece had an average budget deicit In a iscal crisis, the most important measure after the iscal balance measured as a percent of GDP is public expenditures as a percent of GDP. The contrast between Latvia and Greece in terms of public expenditures as a share of GDP was even greater. In the crisis year of 2010, Greece had public expenditures amounting to 52% of GDP, while Latvia's were close, at 44% of GDP. By 2013, Greece's public expenditure share of GDP rose to 59% of GDP, while
Latvia's had fallen to moderately 36% of GDP. In particular, Greece spent much more on public sector employee compensation than other European countries, at 12.4% of GDP as compared with 8% of GDP, for example, in Germany (IMF 2014 (IMF b, 2014c . Relatively poor countries with high public expenditures, such as Hungary, Ukraine, and Greece, do not grow much. An obvious explanation is that the marginal public expenditures were being spent wastefully for the dubious beneit of the politically powerful public employees.
Incidentally, the Latvian share of public expenditures has followed the US share almost exactly, while Greece had the highest public expenditures in Europe in 2013 (Figure 2 ), even beating France, Denmark, and Sweden. The Greek government did cut real public expenditures substantially, but too slowly to reduce their share of the rapidly declining GDP.
Contrary to widespread misperceptions, Greece has had no particular problems with its state revenues. As Tables 1 and 2 show, Greece has increased its already high tax burden substantially, more so than Latvia, which has had a far lower tax burden all along.
Greece's taxes are among Europe's highest, deterring investors, who are also scared away by the worst business environment in Europe, and keeping much of the economy underground.
Europe needs structural reforms to achieve economic growth. Also, in this regard, Latvia did far more than Greece. One important reason is that big cuts in public expenditures cannot be even for all. Therefore, they necessitate structural reforms. The broadest empirical index for structural reform is the Economic Freedom Index of the Fraser Institute. Unfortunately, its latest measure is for 2012, but it shows that from 2010-12, the business environment in Greece deteriorated, while it improved in Latvia ( Figure 3 ). According to the European Commission, Greece carried out substantial structural reform in 2013-14, while structural reforms stalled in Latvia, so Greece might have caught up somewhat, though late in the day.
Resulting in Very Different Outcomes
The consequences of the tepid iscal stabilization in Greece have been devastating: six years of declining output, while the Latvian economy has revived. In 2013, Latvia's GDP at constant prices was 4% lower than in 2008, while Greece's was 23% less than in 2008, according to the IMF (Figure 4) . A cumulative difference in GDP development of 19 percentage points over six years cannot be subject to statistical aberrations. It is real.
Latvia suffered an output fall of 24% in the course of two years from 2008-10, but the cause was external: a severe liquidity freeze that Greece avoided thanks to being a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and, therefore, enabling it to enjoy the abundant liquidity of the European Central Bank (ECB). Having restored its public inances after two years, Latvia has geared up to a solid economic growth of an average of 4.3% a year from 2011-14 ( Figure 5 ). One of the most obvious outcomes of a front-loaded iscal adjustment is that a country incurs less public debt. In spite of Greece having received a substantial a write-off of its privately-held public debt in 2012, its public debt rose from 146% of GDP at the end of 2010 to 174% of GDP at the end of 2014, while the Latvian public debt declined from 47% of GDP to 36% of GDP, far below the Maastricht ceiling of 60% of GDP ( Figure 6 ).
The most striking development is the expansion of exports. Throughout Europe, exports hit a nadir in 2009 and recovered afterwards. Greek exports increased respectably by 45% from 2009-2013, but Latvia's exports skyrocketed by 85% during those same years ( Figure   7 ). The export growth is a relection of structural reform and other efforts to enhance supply.
Latvia did more than Greece early on, which has resulted in an earlier export growth.
The conclusion is that the radical reforms in Latvia unleashed a supply effect that led to previously unachievable exports.
This outcome corresponds to what economic common sense would suggest. The irst task in a inancial crisis is to restore stability and the conidence of markets. Thanks to its frontloaded iscal adjustment, Latvia did so in 10 months, from October 2008 to July 2009. As a result of its unsustainably loose iscal policy, Greece failed to restore the conidence of the markets for ive years. The presence or absence of market conidence results in very low interest rates in Latvia and very high interest rates in Greece, which, in turn, leads to corresponding differences in both investment and consumption and, thus, growth. There are many other aspects as well. Social equity is important. The Latvian government hit against the privileged with new taxes, pursued a political campaign against corruption and the oligarchs, and marginalized two of Latvia's three dominant oligarchs. Consecutive
Greek governments, on the contrary, left the wealthy and the oligarchs alone. The Latvian government closed half of the state agencies and sacked one third of the public employees, which turned out to be a popular move. The Greek government hesitated for years before it reduced the overbearing, privileged, and ineficient public administration. The Latvian government concluded an early social compact with trade unions, employers' associations, and pensioners' associations at the midst of the crisis to get their support for public cuts, while nothing of the kind was even attempted in Greece (Åslund and Dombrovskis 2011). and iscal consolidation, especially in the public sector. The European Union did not realize that a inancial crisis could occur in the euro area and was unprepared in all regards. Initially, it did not want to engage the IMF although it lacked the relevant instruments and expertise.
It indulged in the rich man's folly, to let funds substitute for thoughts. Politics in Greece and the European Union played an important and detrimental role.
The failure of the IMF/EU program for Greece was no surprise. At the time, on May 3, 2010, I published a blog posting that argued:
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The program represents two substantial steps forward. First, the funding is impressive, $145 billion, which might be a suficient amount. The other progress is that it is the right form of an agreement: a standard three-year IMF standby loan and EU co-inancing rather than a new invention. The EU has abandoned its idea of reinventing the wheel in the midst of a crisis in the form of a new EU stabilization facility.
Even so, the program does not appear credible. First, the austerity measures announced are insuficient. A gradual decline of the budget deicit to 3% of GDP in 2014 will not do with 120% of GDP in public debt. Moreover, to judge from the details made public, this is approximately the old program, perhaps with some more front-loading of the measures.
Second, the balance of spending cuts and revenue measures seems inappropriate.
The spending cuts are only 5.25% of GDP over all three years, while the revenue measures are 4% of GDP. The cuts are far too small to be taken seriously, while the revenue aspirations seem unrealistically high. Revenues tend to fall rather than rise in a severe crisis. Expenditure cuts of 6 to 10% of GDP during the irst year would have been more appropriate, as is usually done in such a serious crisis. This looks like a very weak program.
Third, this program would leave Greece with a public debt of 140 to 150% of GDP in 2014, which will be far more than Greece can inance. Assuming an interest rate of 6% per annum, this would amount to 9% of GDP in debt service each year.
No country can manage such a burden. Greece needs a debt restructuring. It would be reasonable to write off approximately half the public debt of $400 billion -that is, $200 billion. The Greek inancial crisis is not likely to be resolved until that is done.
The euro countries and the IMF are simply lending into arrears, which is no good policy.
This was not very original but common sense. Yet rereading these words today, I am afraid that the failure of the Greek program was all too predictable. It was always more political than viable.
Paul Krugman's Advocacy
Since the inancial crisis erupted in Europe in late 2008, Paul Krugman has been the strongest media voice on iscal policy in Europe. 6 From the pulpit of the New York Times, he has persistently argued that austerity is wrong. In 2008-10, when Latvia, as well as Estonia and Lithuania, carried out their successful iscal consolidations, Krugman complained loudly about the terrible consequences of austerity. When they all recorded high economic growth, he refused to concede his defeat.
Early on in his European intellectual odyssey he claimed: "Latvia is the new Argentina" 7 .
As many others, 8 he insisted that Latvia should devalue. His parallel with Argentina also indicated that he saw default as inevitable. But few countries are more different than Argentina and Latvia in size, iscal policy, economic openness, political organization, history, culture, traditions, and location.
Contrary to Krugman's advice, Latvia, as well as its neighbors Estonia and Lithuania,
did not devalue but instead carried out a front-loaded and rigorous iscal adjustment.
As a consequence, not one of them defaulted. Instead, they restored market conidence and swiftly achieved inancial sustainability. Their fast iscal adjustment necessitated substantial structural reforms, and they all started growing quickly after only two years of recession, reaching a high growth trajectory. Because the Baltic governments acted fast and decisively, they could pursue vested interests in both the private and public sectors, which enhanced their political support. The Estonian and Latvian governments were even reelected. Latvia's output had been overblown by its large current account deicit of 22.5% of GDP in both 2006 and 2007. Its economy operated far above its actual production potential.
The IMF assessed that Latvia's actual output exceeded its potential by no less than 9% in 2007, meaning that output had to contract (IMF 2008, 5) . A cooling down and economic contraction seemed both desirable and inevitable, but Krugman protested that "the idea that real GDP and employment can be hugely inlated above sustainable levels by a bubble is questionable" 9 . Krugman criticized Jörg Asmussen, Germany's man at the ECB for asserting in Riga that "the Baltic experience shows that austerity and internal devaluation actually do work." Krugman added: "Notice that his evidence comes entirely from one year of fairly fast growth after an incredible decline. So it's important to say that this proves very little" 10 Presumably, no one has written as many articles and blog posts about the Greek inancial crisis as Krugman. Although his recommendations had not panned out in the Baltics, he advocated the same ideas for Greece, defending the various Greek governments for resisting the imposition of iscal discipline and structural reforms. Krugman paid no attention to Greece's large and lasting budget deicits, its big public debt, and its great corruption (Transparency International 2010). Instead, he called Greece a victim, laying all blame for its predicament on the European Union, the European Monetary Union, and Germany. He claimed that "this isn't a Greek problem, or even a Spain/Italy problem; it's a European problem." He blamed "the arrogance of European oficials, mostly from richer countries, who convinced themselves that they could make a single currency work without a single government" 13. On the odd occasion, Krugman acknowledged "Yes, there are big failings in Greece's economy, its politics, and no doubt its society. But those failings aren't what caused the crisis that is tearing Greece apart… No, the origins of this disaster lie father north, in Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin, where oficials created a deeply-perhaps fatally-lawed monetary system" 14 .
break-up of the euro at least eleven times between April 2010 and July 2012" 15 . Well, that did not happen. Nor did his prediction that Greece would be forced to leave the euro come true.
In parallel, Krugman noted that "I've argued that worries about the deicit are, in fact, grossly exaggerated" 16 . He claimed that "the rush to austerity in Europe largely relected the surge in sovereign debt spreads after Greece got in trouble; the bigger the spread, the harsher the austerity… But it turned out that the spreads didn't relect underlying iscal fundamentals" 17 .
However, at present, the Greek 10-year bond yields are around 9%, while the former EU crisis countries of Italy, Portugal, and Spain have bond yields below 2%.
Strangely, Krugman discusses money as an ininite resource. He does not recognize any budget constraints or that inancing would dry up as happened to so many European countries during the inancial crisis. In particular, in the case of Greece, Krugman's disregard for both the risk of sovereign default and absence of funding is perplexing. Krugman never acknowledges the simple fact that Greece has pursued insuficient iscal responsibility. His persistent advocacy of even less iscal adjustment has contributed to worse iscal policy and thus greater social suffering.
For ive years, Krugman has advocated iscal stimulus 18 , but rapid iscal adjustment turned out to be the best cure for both public inances and economic growth. He ignored that all EU countries had excessive public expenditures and needed structural reforms 19 . Nobody has written so much about the Greek economy, and nobody appears to have been less interested in combating Greece's profound problems of corruption, bureaucracy, and oligarchy.
Only with Syriza's victory in the Greek parliamentary elections on January 25 did Krugman ind a winning party that shared his view of austerity in Europe 20 . After ive long years, one of the 28 EU countries had elected a government of which Krugman approved. Syriza insisted that it would reverse the few reforms that the previous government had managed to carry out. It would restore the excessively high minimum wages, rehire the public servants that the previous government had managed to lay off, reintroduce collective work agreements, and stop privatizations 21 .
After three days, the Greek markets had plummeted by a ifth, and Krugman backpedaled.
"Markets are panicking," he asserted. Then, he added: "It's important to understand that this is not a verdict on the new Greek government, or at any rate only the new Greek government; it's a judgment that the risk of no agreement, and a disorderly breakdown of the whole process, is high" 22 . But as his readers so well know, the European Union is always at fault, never Greece, and certainly not Krugman.
Finally, Steven Rattner has summed it up well:
"the thousands of words that [Krugman] has written about the Euro crisis don't suggest that he has spent any time trying to understand how the private sector actually functions (or doesn't) within the Eurozone… For Krugman, the problems of Europe are all about the classic Keynesian slant of insuficient demand, brought on by miserly monetary policy and iscal austerity insisted upon by Germany and its factotums in the Eurozone's command post in Brussels" 23 .
The IMF Followed Krugman's Lead
In the midst of the inancial crisis, desperate G-20 leaders threw well-established economic insights overboard and embraced old-style Keynesianism once again, focusing on maximizing aggregate demand. At the November 2008 G-20 summit in Washington, leaders declared their intention to "use iscal measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid effect, as appropriate, while maintaining a policy framework conducive to iscal sustainability" (G-20, 2008 ).
The IMF translated the G-20 recommendation into action. It recommended all countries that had "iscal space" to pursue iscal expansion. In the winter of 2008-09, the world as a whole was in a liquidity freeze, a truly Keynesian situation, and stimulus made sense. However, there are at least two big problems with iscal stimulus.
First, it is close to impossible to determine when iscal space exists, and it varies quickly with international inancial markets. In late 2008, for example, Latvia and Romania lost market access when their public debt was less than 20% of GDP, showing how minimal their iscal space was.
Second, temporary iscal stimulus tends to become permanent, leading to chronic budget deicits. Cyprus and Slovenia offer excellent illustrations. In 2008, both countries had relatively limited public debt (22% and 49% of GDP, respectively). In 2009, however, both expanded their budget deicits to 6% of GDP, where they stagnated, eventually ending up in inancial crisis. The IMF's chief economist Olivier Blanchard wrote an excellent academic paper on the Latvian boom, bust, and recovery together with two IMF colleagues (Blanchard, Grifiths, and Gruss 2013) . They pointed out that "the timing of events makes it clear that iscal adjustment was not responsible for much of the drop in output" (p. 364). They also noted that there "is some evidence that the announcement of a clear iscal path was associated with increased conidence" (p. 364). However, without much of an argument they claim: "Whether the frontloading aspect of the iscal adjustment made the whole adjustment program more credible cannot be settled" (p. 364). They conclude swiftly that "the experience of Latvia sheds little light on the issue of the optimal speed of iscal consolidation" (p. 364). This appears to deny obvious facts because the authors did not like them. Adding the experience of the two neighboring Baltic states and several years of success, evidence does not come much stronger. Budget Deicit (% of GDP) -4, 9 -7,8 -4,9 -7,3 Sources: IMF, Republic of Latvia, "Request for Stand-By Arrangement," December 19, 2008 , 1, www. imf.org (accessed February 9, 2015 , IMF, WEO October 2014 database. Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -8,4 -10,3 -7,1 -9,9 -5,6 -2,5 Budget Deicit -11 -7,6 -9,6 -6,5 -6,4 Sources: After having discarded this obvious evidence, Blanchard dove into the esoteric. In January 2013, he and his colleague Daniel Leigh (2013) published a working paper arguing that iscal multipliers-the change in output induced by a change in the government's budget deicit -were larger in current circumstances than previously thought. Tight iscal policy, in other words, would squeeze output more than economic modelers had typically supposed.
The implication was that iscal adjustment should be delayed. There were many problems with this paper. It was based on forecasts of economic growth, but in the early stage of a crisis, forecasts tend to be widely off the mark.
Economic forecasts in the midst of a inancial crisis are next to impossible to make because so many factors are unknown, notably economic policy and international inancing.
IMF forecasts at the beginning of the crisis in Latvia and Greece illustrate the degree of uncertainty. In December 2008, the IMF predicted that Latvia's GDP would fall by 5% in 2009, but the outcome was a fall of 18%; that is, 13% more. Similarly, in May 2010, the IMF predicted that Greece's GDP in 2011 would contract by 2.6%, but it declined by 7.1% (Table 3 ).
The forecasts of other variables are hardly better. In December 2008, the IMF predicted that
Latvia would have a current account deicit of 7.3% of GDP in 2009, but instead it showed a surplus of 8.6% of GDP. This is not a criticism of the IMF, because it is nearly impossible to make reasonable predictions in the midst of a crisis, but it makes little sense to use such forecasts to calculate any iscal multiplier.
The Blanchard-Leigh argument also presumes that a country has access to the capital market, but the IMF intervenes when a country has lost such access. Moreover, in the midst of a crisis, the political economy is conducive to radical reform, while reform becomes much more dificult later on. A crisis is a terrible thing to waste, but that became the oficial IMF advice. Finally, the Blanchard-Leigh paper is entirely short-term, focusing on GDP in the year after a iscal adjustment. But what matters is long-term economic growth, and that depends on structural reforms.
Such an inluential IMF paper changes the policy of that institution. An eminent example of its transmission from the esoteric to the practical was the IMF public evaluation of its Greek experiences: Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement (IMF 2013). As argued above, the Greek inancial crisis was a classical public inance crisis, and the IMF had failed in its irst task to solve the iscal crisis. The obvious answer is that iscal adjustment should have been much faster and front-loaded to restore conidence and iscal sustainability. The Fund authors adopted a thoughtless attitude: "The required adjustment in the primary balance, 14.5 percentage points of GDP, was an enormous adjustment with relatively few precedents…" (p. 20). Well, not really.
The Baltic countries had just done more, and all post-Soviet countries carried out greater iscal adjustments (Åslund 2002, 226) .
The IMF evaluators were better when it came to evaluating the mix of iscal measures Greece had been requested to undertake, asking whether they were appropriate. Sensibly, they stated that the "large dose of revenue measures… can be questioned, particularly since tax changes constituted almost half of the measures targeted for the irst two years of the program" (p. 23).
They rightly complained that the burden of adjustment was overwhelmingly put on the private sector. Strangely, the authors did not draw the obvious conclusion that Greece had excessive public expenditures that were bound to harm economic growth.
For unknown reasons, the fund's evaluators posed only Krugmanite questions. The implicit starting point of this "evaluation" was that the budget deicit could not have been cut more or faster, which was incorrect. The authors realized that additional inancing in the last three years was not possible. These assumptions led to the logical conclusion: "An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece…" (p. 28). But a debt restructuring has been carried out and it did not save Greece because the public expenditures and budget deicit remained far too high.
Conclusion: Front-Load Fiscal Adjustment in a Crisis
Among the EU countries, Latvia and Greece stand out because, in the midst of the crisis, they had the largest potential budget deicits and they experienced equally large cumulative real output contractions of nearly a quarter of GDP in comparison with their 2008 peak GDP.
But their governments pursued the opposite iscal strategies when the crisis hit. One strategy was successful and the other amounted to a failure. Obviously, the irst strategy is preferable.
This leads to a broader conclusion.
In severe inancial distress, three policies are normally enacted. First, the country in trouble needs to cut its budget deicit so that its public inances become sustainable. Second, the suffering country must carry out substantial structural reforms so that economic growth can be unleashed. Third, the international community, mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), possibly with some support from others like European authorities, provides suficient low interest rate credits so that the public and international debt can be managed.
The conclusion of this paper is straightforward. The irst year of iscal adjustment was decisive for the success of Latvia and the failure of Greece. If a country is in a serious inancial crisis because of an excessive iscal deicit, it is well advised to front-load its iscal adjustment as much as is practically and politically possible. More often than not, the radical front-loading of iscal adjustment has proven popular with voters, as Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Sweden proved during the crisis, because this is a matter of political leadership. 24 Latvia's Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis was reelected twice, while George Papandreou lost massively. The crucial task is to restore market conidence.
No size its all. The greater the iscal crisis, the more iscal adjustment is needed. If a country is big, the market may offer substantial international inancing, allowing it a much larger budget deicit than it would for a small country. The Eurozone has reinforced conidence so that the market has been very tolerant (too tolerant) also of small countries with large public debts. How large the iscal adjustment has to be is ultimately a matter of judgment and not of sophisticated mathematics.
It is strange that many economists, notably Krugman, still believe that iscal stimulus can be beneicial even if a country enjoys no market conidence. Nor can any iscal multiplier be operative if elementary inancial stability and international inancing are absent. In addition, all too many American economists discussing Europe do not realize how severe the structural barriers are in many European economies. If potential growth is zero as in Italy, no iscal stimulus is likely to be effective, while supply-increasing policies can be.
This paper deals with only two countries to make the difference obvious, but it is all too evident that an expansion to more countries would not contradict the thesis. Estonia and Lithuania pursued the same policies as Latvia. Among the crisis countries in the Eurozone, Ireland has done the best thanks to the most far-reaching iscal adjustment and structural reforms.
One would only hope that the IMF would adopt this policy of demanding front-loaded iscal adjustment rather than focusing on dubious iscal multipliers.
